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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
oooOooo 
KEN RAY HARWARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY, UTAH COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, PLEASANT GROVE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, LEHI CITY, 
LEHI POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
PROVO CITY, PROVO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, and JOHN 
DOES 1 THRU 10, 
Defendants. 
This is an appeal from the trial court's erroneous grant of Summary 
Judgment in favor of me defendants. The court granted summary judgment allegedly 
due to two reasons: (1) The plaintiff failed to properly serve the city and county clerks 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1998) rather than the 1997 version which was 
relied on by Plaintiff at the time delivering his Notices of Claim. 
Case No. 990707-CA 
Priority No. 15 
The court accepted the defendants' arguments that they did not receive any notice of die 
claims; and (2) the court accepted the defendants' erroneous computation of time. The 
court bought the argument that the Court should find that the Plaintiff was one day late 
filing his Complaint with the district court by applying Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 
(1953, as amended) and then computed the date of delivery to be the date of so-called 
mailing. The date that Plaintiff shipped the notices via U.S. Express Mail1 was June 
6th, 1996. The Plaintiff intended die notices to be delivered on the 7th of June-to meet 
the one-year filing deadline for notices of claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
13 (1953, as amended). 
The Plaintiff was severely prejudiced by the court when it accepted the 
defendants arguments. Firsdy, the Plaintiff did comply widi Section 63-30-11 by 
delivering said notices of claim to me governing bodies' respective councils. 
Secondly, the court violated me Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the 
computation of time. The rule specifically disallows the inclusion of the "day of the 
act, event, or default" in the computation of time. The court allowed such an inclusion 
and found that the Plaintiff failed to file his Complaint timely by a day. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on uiis Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
1
 Which the court should take judicial notice that the postmaster guarantees over-
night delivery. 
2 
(1953, as amended) (2) (j) (cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court). The appellant appeals the final order and judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Utah County involving wrongful refusal to return personal 
property in spite of a court order to do so. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Plaintiff complied with Section 63-30-11 (1997) by effecting 
delivery to the defendant's "responsible governmental entities." 
2. Whether the Plaintiff effected delivery on June 7th, 1996 as guaranteed by 
the courier U.S. Express Mail, or on June 6th, 1996 by mail pursuant to Section 63-37-
1 1953, as amended). 
3. Whether the trial court erroneously computed the time for filing the 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court misinterpreted and or otherwise misapplied Sections 
63-30-11 and 63-37-1 against the Plaintiff and incorrectly computed the filing deadline 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under 
a correction of error standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P.2d at 759. 
3 
State v. Bagshaw. 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Because the application of a statute is a question of law, the appellate court must review 
for correctness the actions of the trial court. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment of the Fourth 
District Court. The trial court granted summary judgment against the Plaintiff and in 
favor of the defendants. The key issues are that the trial court incorrectly computed the 
filing deadline for the Plaintiffs Complaint and prejudicially applied a modified 
statutory provision that was not in effect at the time the Plaintiff had his notices of 
claim delivered to the responsible governmental entities. At the February 2, 1999 
hearing, the trial court demanded the Plaintiffs counsel to show the court how the 
4 
Plaintiff complied with Section 63-30-11 (1998).2 (H. at 30-39).3 
77. Course of the Proceedings: 
On or about June 9, 1995, the defendants, by and through agents, 
auctioned the Plaintiffs personal property without just compensation in violation of a 
court order and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution, (R. at 3-4, 196-
198, 254; H. at 28). As a result, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997), Mr. 
Harward had prepared and delivered notices of claim to believed responsible 
governmental entities, Utah County, Lehi City, Pleasant Grove City, and Provo City. 
This was accomplished by not only serving them onto the city council. (R. at 118-130). 
Facing a one-year deadline, on June 6th, 1996, the Plaintiff chose a courier who 
guaranteed over-night delivery by 10:30 a.m. (H. at 28). All of the notices of claim 
were to have their respective notices of claim delivered to them on June 7th, 1996. (R. 
at 155, 157; H. at 10). With the guarantee, it is presumed tiiat the notices were all 
delivered no later than that and certainly within 3 days to the deadline as the statute 
required. If not delivered by June 9th, 1996, further proceeding by Plaintiff would be 
time barred. 
2
 It was not then-known that a modification occurred during the course of the year. 
Hence, counsel was not prepared to argue that point because it was not raised in the 
defendant's dispositive motions. 
3
 The record does not have a continuous pagination for the Hearing transcript, it 
simply has a paginated cover of 409. Therefore, for simplicity in briefing, any references 
to the file will be cited as an "R" and citations to the transcript will be shown as an "H". 
5 
All of the defendants claimed that Plaintiffs delivery through a courier 
other than certified or registered U.S. Mail constituted mailing anyway on that date 
which would arguably mean that the date of delivery to the responsible governmental 
entities was on June 6th, 1996 pursuant to Section 63-37-1 et seq. (R. at 110, 168, 205, 
Pursuant to Utah Law, under Section 63-30-14, the plaintiff must then 
allow the governmental entities 90 days to accept liability. Once the 90 days expires or 
when the entities otherwise deny liability, the plaintiff must file his suit within one year 
from that date or face being time-barred. The date of the expiration is the question 
before this Court. The defendants all claim that none of them admitted liability and 
they all deny submitting to Plaintiff rejection letters. Thus, the only issue is when the 
actual 90 days expired. (R. at 262). The defendants all claim that the 90-days expired 
ninety-days from June 6th, 1996 or September 4th, 1996.4 Id. 
The Plaintiff relying on the plain language of Section 63-30-11, requiring 
their "delivery" to the governmental bodies did not consider the claims delivered until 
June 7th, 1996. The delivery of said notices is specifically required by Section 63-30-11 
to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et seq. and the Plaintiff did 
not generally rely on other provisions outside of the Act. The defendants on the other 
hand all argued that the Plaintiffs delivery of said notice was accomplished on June 6th, 
4
 Except for Pleasant Grove who interestingly attempts to purport even a need to 
earlier file as soon as September 3rd, 1996. This argument was not adopted by the Court. 
Such an argument disregarded the well-established computation rule not to include the date 
of the "act, event, or default." See Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6 
1996 because of the general provision Section 63-37-1 et seq. The court ultimately 
bought the argument and concluded that the Plaintiff delivered his notices of claim on 
June 6th. (H. at 48-50). However, this notion is misplaced. In order for a party to 
claim protection under Section 63-37-1, he needs to full compliance with the provisions 
outlined in Section 63-37-2. The minimum requirements provide that the documents 
need to be certified or registered mail delivered to the U.S. Mail with a follow up 
within 30 days thereafter. (H. at 34). No such action was taken by die Plaintiff for the 
defendants claim Section 63-37-l's application against the Plaintiff. As a matter of 
fact, no defendant raised an affirmative defense a violation of Section 63-37-1. (H. at 
25). 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff had until September 5, 1997 in which to file his 
Complaint. (R. at 157). However, according to the defendants' claim and the Court's 
adopted position, the complaint allegedly should have been filed with the court on 
September 4th, 1997. But as the Court put it, "it appears to me that 63-37-1 does 
control in this case." (H. at 48). The court, however, has erred. The U.S. Express 
Mail service is in direct competition with UPS, Federal Express, Airborne Express, 
DHL, and other such courier services-just to name a few. 
17/. Disposition in Trial Court: 
No trial occurred. On February 2, 1999, the trial court held a disposition 
7 
motions hearing. (R. at 323, 409). Consequently, the court held that Section 63-37-1 
was controlling and he granted summary judgment for the defendants. (H. at 48). 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
See part II above.5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court granted 
summary judgment allegedly due to two reasons: (1) The plaintiff failed to properly 
serve the city and county clerks pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1998). The 
Plaintiff served the defendants' respective governing bodies pursuant to the 1997 
version of said provision. The court accepted the defendants' arguments that they did 
not receive any notice of the claims in spite of them being delivered to the city council 
and their respective police chiefs. 
Also, the court erroneously agreed with the defendants that Section 
63-37-1 was controlling, which consequently affected the computation of time. The 
court bought the argument that the Court should find that the Plaintiff was one day late 
filing his Complaint with the district court by applying Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 
(1953, as amended) and then computed the date of delivery to be the date of so-called 
s
 The course of the proceedings is the nature of this appeal as this matter was 
dismissed with the granting summary judgment for die defendants. 
8 
mailing. The date that Plaintiff shipped the notices via U.S. Express Mail6 was June 
6th, 1996. The Plaintiff intended the notices to be delivered on the 7th of June-to meet 
the one-year filing deadline for notices of claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
13 (1953, as amended) (the deadline was June 9th, 1999). 
The Plaintiff was severely prejudiced by the court when it accepted the 
defendants arguments. Firsdy, the Plaintiff did comply with Section 63-30-11 by 
delivering said notices of claim to the governing bodies' respective councils. 
Secondly, the court violated Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the 
computation of time. The rule specifically disallows the inclusion of the "day of the 
act, event, or default" in the computation of time. The court allowed such an inclusion 
and found that the Plaintiff failed to file his Complaint timely by a day. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL AS A MATTER 
OF LAW-THE PLAINTIFF'S DELIVERY BY U.S. EXPRESS MAIL ON JUNE T\ 
1996 WAS THE APPROPRIATE DATE TO START THE COMPUTATION FOR A 
SEPTEMBER 5. 1997 DEADLINE FOR FILING HIS COMPLAINT. 
On or about June 9, 1995, the defendants, by and through agents, 
auctioned Mr. Harward's personal property without just compensation in violation of a 
6
 Which the court should take judicial notice that the postmaster guarantees over-
night delivery. 
court order and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution. (R. at 3-4, 196-
198, 254; H. at 28). As a result, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997), Mr. 
Harward had prepared and delivered notices of claim to believed responsible 
governmental entities, Utah County, Lehi City, Pleasant Grove City, and Provo City. 
This was accomplished by not only serving them onto the city council, (R. at 118-130), 
but onto their respective police chiefs. The Utah Supreme Court, in Sweet v. Salt 
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913) stated that the purpose of notice-of-claim 
requirement is to require every claimant to state clearly all of the elements of his claims 
to the board of commissioners or city council for allowance as a condition precedent to 
his right to sue the city and recover his damages in an ordinary action. 
Facing a one-year deadline, on June 6th, 1996, the Plaintiff chose a 
courier who guaranteed over-night delivery by 10:30 a.m. (H. at 28).7 All of the 
notices of claim were to have their respective notices of claim delivered to them on 
June 7th, 1996. (R. at 155, 157; H. at 10). With the guarantee, it's presumed that the 
notices were all delivered no later than that date and certainly within 3 days to the 
deadline just as the 1997 version of Section 63-30-11 required. If not delivered by June 
9th, 1996, further proceeding by Plaintiff would be time barred. Any claimant only has 
one year to demand a claim. It's for this reason, the Plaintiff believed that he 
7
 Bruce Oliver, Plaintiffs attorney, debated between using U.S. Express Mail 
service, UPS, Federal Express, Airborne Express, and DHL. He selected U.S. Express 
Mail because the nearest post office was only a-half-a-block away located at 230 West 200 
South. 
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substantially complied with Section 63-30-11. This Section read: 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim 
were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by die person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the 
requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to 
the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend 
the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider 
whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the 
governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997). 
In this matter, the Plaintiff complied with this provision to the letter. This 
statute specifically deals with notice of claims and dealing with matters under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. The focal point in this matter is the "delivery" to the 
"responsible governmental bodies". This was accomplished by the Plaintiff timely. 
i i 
The date that the delivery was to be completed in light of the U.S. Express Mail 
guarantee is that the delivered would be accomplished no later than 10:30 a.m. 
following the date it was placed into the care of the courier-in this case it happened to 
be the postmaster. 
Because the Plaintiff chose the postmaster, the defendants were armed 
with a shaky defense that this accomplished mailing and that pursuant to Section 63-37-
1 et seq. the date of delivery was June 6th instead of June 7th. In this matter, defendants 
are not entitled to the defense. Firstly, Section 63-30-11 is specific in nature and 
Section 63-37-1 is a general one. Contrary to the defendants' arguments and the 
court's conclusion, Section 63-37-1 is not controlling. The long-standing policy is that 
"specific statutes control over more general ones," State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 
(Utah 1994). Since the issue at hand is whether their was compliance with the 
immunity act any other provision dealing with mailing claims in general is not 
controlling. However, Plaintiff would concede that such a general provision could 
have been utilized by him however he would not be entitled to its protection unless 
there was strict compliance with the provisions of Section 63-37-1 et seq. See Litster v. 
Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this matter, 
the Plaintiff did not attempt service under Section 63-37-1 et seq. Moreover, there was 
no strict compliance of said provisions. Without strict compliance with the plain 
language of the sections it cannot be applied to protect any party whether raised by the 
12 
defense or by the Plaintiff. In this case, the defense. 
Section 63-37-1 et seq. provides: 
Section 63-37-1. When Postmark date deemed filing date - When mailing date 
deemed filing date. 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any payment 
required or authorized to be filed or made to the state of Utah, or to any political 
subdivision thereof, which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be deemed filed or made 
and received by the state or political subdivisions on the date shown by the 
post-office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate 
wrapper containing it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political subdivisions where received 
and the cancellation mark is illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed 
filed or made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender establishes by 
competent evidence that the report, claim, tax return, statement or other 
document or payment was deposited in the United States mail on or before the 
date for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any such report, tax 
return, statement, or other document required by law to be filed, the sender files 
with the state or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after written 
notification is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its 
nonreceipt of such report, tax return, statement, or other document. 
63-37-2. Registered or certified mail - Record as proof of delivery. 
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or payment is 
sent by United States mail and either registered or certified, a record 
authenticated by the United States post office of such registration or certification 
shall be considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax return, 
statement or other document or payment was delivered to the state officer or 
state agency or officer or agency of the political subdivision to which addressed, 
and the date of registration or certification shall be deemed the postmarked date. 
63-37-3. Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. 
If the date for filing any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other 
document or making any such payment falls upon a Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday, such acts shall be considered timely if performed on the next business 
13 
day. 
Id. 
All of the defendants claimed that Plaintiffs delivery was June 6th, 1996 
pursuant to 63-37-1. However, their arguments do not withstand the Litster Test. In 
Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this 
Court stated that there was "delineates a two-step process by which receipt can be 
established." The Court went on to explain: 
The document shall be deemed filed or made and received on the date it was 
mailed if the sender establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, tax 
return, statement or other document or payment was deposited in the United 
States mail on or before the date for filing or paying; and. . . the sender files 
with the state or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after written 
notification is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its 
nonreceipt of such report, tax return, statement, or other document. 
Id. (Emphasis by the Court). In this matter, the Plaintiff was not relying on Section 63-
37-1 as was Litster. Litster was not allowed to claim mailing protection under Section 
63-37-1 as the defendants in this should not be allowed. Reliance on Section 63-37-1 is 
clearly misplaced. The Plaintiff did not send the notices of claim to the governmental 
entities via certified or registered U.S. Mail. The Plaintiff intended their delivery to be 
on June 7th, 1996 as required under Section 63-30-11. This is contrary to the 
defendants claims; the defendants argued that the effective date of delivery should have 
been June 6th, 1996. (R. at 110, 168, 205). This notion is wrong. 
Moreover, "In determining whether the trial court properly found there 
were no genuine material issues of fact, we review the facts in the light most favorable 
14 
to the losing party, while giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." 
Promark Group. Inc. v. Harris Corp., 860 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah App. 1993); accord 
Projects Unlimited. Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 
1990). In this matter, it is highly likely that this Court will find in favor of Mr. 
Harward. In essence, the defendants are arguing that the trial court should grant them 
summary judgment not for the Complaint being filed late but rather because they were 
given one extra day notice prior to filing of the Complaint. This is not a fair and just 
way of conducting government. The government cannot have their cake and eat it too! 
kiLitster, the government won because Section 63-37-1 was not applied thereby 
causing defective notice of claim. In this case, it is the government who is attempting 
to use Section 63-37-1 to its favor. This time claiming that Mr. Harward filed his 
claim on June 6th, 1996 and not by relying on Section 63-30-1, which specifically 
mandates a "delivery." The statute fails to describe mailing or filing as specific 
conduct necessary for complying with the notice requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Pursuant to Utah Law, under Section 63-30-14, the plaintiff must then 
allow the governmental entities 90 days to accept liability. Once the 90 days expires or 
when the entities otherwise deny liability, the plaintiff must file his suit within one year 
from that date or face being time-barred. The date of the expiration is the question 
before this Court. The defendants all claim that none of them admitted liability and 
15 
they all deny submitting to Plaintiff rejection letters. Thus, the only issue is when the 
actual 90 days expired. (R. at 262). The defendants all claim that the 90-days expired 
ninety-days from June 6th, 1996 or September 4th, 1996.8 Id. 
The Plaintiff relying on the plain language of Section 63-30-11, requiring 
their "delivery" to the governmental bodies did not consider the claims delivered until 
June 7th, 1996. The delivery of said notices is specifically required by Section 63-30-11 
to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et seq. and the Plaintiff did 
not rely on other general provisions outside of the Act. The defendants on the other 
hand all argued that the Plaintiffs delivery of said notice was accomplished on June 6th, 
1996 claiming Section 63-37-1 et seq. application. The court ultimately bought the 
argument and concluded that Mr. Harward delivered his notices of claim on June 6th. 
(H. at 48-50). However, as stated above, this notion is misplaced. In order for a party 
to claim protection under Section 63-37-1, he needs to full compliance with the 
provisions outlined in Section 63-37-2. The minimum requirements provide that the 
documents need to be certified or registered mail delivered to the U.S. Mail with a 
follow up within 30 days thereafter. (H. at 34). No such action was taken by the 
Plaintiff for the defendants to seek protection under Section 63-37-1. As a matter of 
fact, no defendant raised an affirmative defense a violation of Section 63-37-1. (H. at 
8
 Except for Pleasant Grove who interestingly attempts to purport even a need to 
earlier file as soon as September 3rd, 1996. This argument was not adopted by the Court. 
Such an argument disregarded the well-established computation rule not to include the date 
of the "act, event, or default." See Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
16 
25). Arguably, the defendants' failure to raise 63-37-1 as an affirmative defense may 
constitute a waiver of said claim pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Nevertheless, still relying on the specific language of Section 63-30-11 the 
Plaintiff understandably believed that he had until September 5, 1997 in which to file 
his Complaint. (R. at 157). However, according to the defendants' claim and the 
Court's adopted position, the complaint allegedly should have been filed with the court 
on September 4th, 1997. But as the Court put it, "it appears to me that 63-37-1 does 
control in this case." (H. at 48). The court, however, has erred. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Harward has been unjustly treated in this matter. The trial court 
has erroneously imposed Section 63-37-1 against him which has unknowingly caused 
him to lose a day in which to file his Complaint. This effect has time-barred him from 
pursuing the merits of his claims. In has also caused him a deprivation of his 
substantive right to due process. The Governmental Immunity Act specifically has 
outlined the obligations of the claimant. Mr. Harward knew he had one year to file his 
notice of claim. He did so with the intentions of them being "delivered" on June 7th, 
1996 consistent with Section 63-30-11. Mr. Harward also knew he had 90 days from 
that date to in which to wait for acceptance or rejection of the claim. If acceptance was 
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not made and there was no rejection within that time the claimant is to presume 
rejection at the end of the 90 days. Finally, once that 90 days has expired, Mr. 
Harward knew that he would have to file his Complaint within one year of that 
rejection. In this case, that date would be September 5, 1997-the date he filed. At no 
time prior to this was Mr. Harward ever on notice that he would have to file by 
September 4th, 1997. Within the Governmental Immunity Act there is no reference to, 
or even a suggestion that, he would be bound to the provisions contained within any 
other general provisions. The mailing provisions of Sections 63-37-1 et seq. were not 
attempted by Mr. Harward, nor did he comply with them. The court allowed the 
defendants to apply Section 63-37-1, however this was erroneous. It is clear that the 
defendants cannot show that the Plaintiff strictly complied with the plain language of 
Section 63-37-1. As in Litster, in order for Section 63-37-1 to apply, there must be a 
showing that Mr. Harward not only sent his claims via certified or registered mail, but 
that Mr. Harward also followed the mailing within 30 days. The was not even the 
case. Mr. Harward made suitable arrangements with a courier to effect delivery with 
three entities to their councils and their police chiefs. There is no way that all of the 
notice never made it to the governing bodies responsible. 
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ADDENDUM 
Art. I, § 8 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 680 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substant ial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail await ing tr ial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substant ia l evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by s ta tu te as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substant ial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence tha t the person 
would constitute a substant ial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusua l punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec . 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of tr ial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital -cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the ju ry shall consist of 
no fewer t han eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the rmmber of jurors by s ta tu te , but in no event 
shall a ju ry consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a Verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. ,, 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to h im i n his person,' property or reputat ion, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this Sta te , by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
na tu re and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the at tendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impart ial ju ry of the county or 
district in whicfythe offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment , be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of tha t examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by s tatute 
or rule in whole or in par t a t any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretr ial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s ta tu te or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand ju ry . ] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State , or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and t h e powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no war ran t shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain t he freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the ju ry tha t the mat ter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the par ty shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed grant ing irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general na ture shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
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Section 3. Appropriation. 
There is appropriated from the Commerce Service 
Fund for fiscal year 1998-99: 
(1) $3,500 to the Senate to pay for the 
compensation and expenses of senators on the task 
force; 
(2) $5,000 to the House of Representatives to pay 
for the compensation and expenses of 
representatives on the task force; and 
(3) $15,000 to the Office of Legislative Research 
and General Counsel to pay for staffing the task 
force. 
Section 4. Repeal date. 
This act is repealed November 30,1998. 
S.B. 43 
Passed 2/23/1998 
Governor's Action: Sign 3/14/1998 
Effective 5/04/1998 
Laws of Utah 1998, Chapter 164 
Governmental Immunity - Notice of 
Claim 
Sponsor: Michael G. Waddoups 
AN ACT Relating to Governmental Immunity; 
Modifying Provisions for Claims Against 
Government Entities; and Making Technical 
Corrections. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
63-30-11, as last amended by Chapter 76, Laws 
of Utah 1991 
63-30-12, as last amended by Chapter 75, Laws 
of Utah 1987 
63-30-13, as last amended by Chapter 75, Laws 
of Utah 1987 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 63-30-11 is amended to read: 
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents 
- Service - Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations 
that would apply if the claim were against a private 
person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against [an] its employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of [his] the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority shall file a 
written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(in) the damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to [the response 
governmental entity according to the requirement 
of Section 63 30 12 or 63-30-13*]: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim h 
against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against t 
county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrate* 
of the board, when the claim is against a school 
district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when 
the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against 
the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, whenlhj 
claim is against any other public board, commission; 
or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age tf 
majority, or mentally incompetent and without j 
legal guardian at the time the claim arises, thj 
claimant may apply to the court to extend the tinti 
for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to tbi 
governmental entity, the court may extend the turn 
for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension thai 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant ai 
extension, the court shall consider whether the delaj 
in serving the notice of claim will substantiallj 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining 
defense on the merits. 
Section 2. Section 63-30-12 is amended to read: 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee -
Time for filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employ 
for an act or omission occurring during 
performance of [hk] the employee's duties, wit] 
the scope of employment, or under color 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filo 
with the attorney general [and the agent 
within one year after the claim arises, or before l_. 
expiration of any extension of time granted undo 
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not tfl 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized ft£ 
governmental. 
Section 3. Section 63-30-13 is amended to read: 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or 
its employee - Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or againsg 
its employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of [his] the employee's duties*! 
within the scope of employment, or under color oj 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filc^ 
with the governing body of the political subdivision 
according to the requirements of Section 63-3(M| 
within one year after the claim arises, or before tb* 
expiration of any extension of time granted undrf 
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not thj 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
<L*> 
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(2) The state planning coordinator shall review and forward 
the comments and recommendations of the RDCC to: 
(a) the governor; 
(b) the initiating state agency, in the case of a proposed 
state action; and 
(c) the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 1994 
63-28a-6. Powers of state agencies and local govern-
ments not limited. 
This chapter shall not limit powers conferred upon depart-
ments, agencies, or instrumentalities of state or local govern-
ments by existing law. 1981 
63-28a-7. Repea l ed . 1994 
CHAPTER 29 
UTAH STATE FIRE PREVENTION LAW 
(Renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 220, §§ 1 to 22.) 
63-29-1 to 63-29-27. Renumbered as §§ 63-27-101 to 63-
27-122. 
CHAPTER 29a 
LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS BOARD 
(Renumbered by Laws 1993, ch. 234, 
§§ 324 to 338). 
63-29a-101 to 63-29a-112. Renumbered as §§ 53-7-302 to 
53-7-316. 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 
63-30-1. Short title. 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or 
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of im-
munity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of 
employee — limitations on personal liabil-
ity. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obliga-
tions. 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving 
property. 
63-30-7. Repealed. 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of high-
ways, bridges, or other structures. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous 
or defective public building, structure, or 
other public improvement — Exception. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by neg-
ligent act or omission of employee — Excep-
tions. 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private prop-
erty without compensation. 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys* fees for records requests. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury,-f Notice — Contents — 
Service — Legal disability. 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
63-30-13. Claim againstrpoHticel subdivision or its em-
ployee - r Time for filing notice. 
63-30-14. Claim for iftuiy;-^Approval or denial by 
Section 
governmental entity or insurance carrier 
within ninety days. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and 
time for filing action against governmental 
entity. 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — 
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity bars 
action against employee. 
63-30-21. Repealed. 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited — 
Governmental entity exempt from execution, 
attachment, or garnishment. 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state — 
Presentment for payment. 
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision — Procedure by governing body.' 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision — Installment payments. 
63-30*26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or pur-
chase of insurance created by political sub-
divisions. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment 
of claims, judgments, or insurance premi-
ums. 
63-30-28. Liability insurance—Purchase of insurance or 
self-insurance by governmental entity autj 
thorized — Establishment of trust accounts, 
for self-insurance. 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government vehicles, 
operated by employees outside scope of em-
ployment. 
63-30-30. Repealed. 
63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy 
not in compliance with act. 
63-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or 
renewal. 
63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees 
authorized — No right to indemnification oi 
contribution from governmental agency. ' 
63-30-34^ Limitation of judgments against governmental 
entity or employee — Insurance coverage 
exception. 
63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general counse^ 
for state judiciary, and general counsel foij 
the Legislature in representing the state, its 
branches, members, or employees. 
63-30-36. Defending government employee — Request 
Cooperation — Payment of judgment. 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costsi 
by government employee. 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by emi 
ployee not required. 
63-30-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah! 
Governmental Immunity Act." H**« 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action fori 
money or damages against a governmental entity <*M 
against an employee. 
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(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's 
officers, employees, servants, trustees, commission-
ers, members of a governing body, members of a 
board, members of a commission, or members of an 
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance 
with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certificated 
in accordance with Section 53A-6-101, educational 
aides, students engaged in providing services to 
members of the public in the course of an approved 
medical, nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but 
does not include an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identi-
fied in Subsection (2Xa), whether or not the indi-
vidual holding that position receives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its 
political subdivisions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure 
to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a gov-
ernmental entity whether or not the act, failure to 
act, operation, function, or undertaking is character-
ized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmen-
tal function, unique to government, undertaken in a 
dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a gov-
ernment or governmental function, or could be per-
formed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed 
by any department, agency, employee, agent, or offi-
cer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to 
or los6 of property, or any other injury that a person may 
suffer to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if 
inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
' ' (6) "Persoristllnjury" means an injury of any kind other 
tnan property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, 
school district, .public transit. district, redevelopment 
agency, special improvement or taxing district, or other 
governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any 
right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property, 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, 
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
mental i ty of the state. 1994 
'GS-SO-S. Immunity of governmental e n t i t i e s f rom su i t . 
&l
 U) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other gov-
ernmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following 
state medical programs and services performed at a 
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to 
the core of governmental activity in this state and are 
considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or 
physician because of the high risk nature of the 
patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah 
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided 
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropri-
ate medical care or treatment at another medical 
facility in Utah; and 
dv) any other service or procedure performed at a 
state-owned university hospital or by physicians em-
ployed at a state-owned university acting in the scope 
of their employment that a court finds is unique or 
essential to the core of governmental activity in this 
state. 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the 
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may 
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and 
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to 
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center 
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their 
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in'Tltle 
62A, Chapter 4. 1991 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or 
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immu-
nity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of em-
ployee — Limitations on personal liability! 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifi-
cally1 provided, may be construed as an admission or 
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental 
entities or their employees. 
(1?) jlf immunity from suty is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by 
any waiver of immunity in this chapterr nor may any 
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict 
liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely 
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity 
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law,, 
(3)1 (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action 
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its 
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that 
occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of author-
ity is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil 
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter 
against the employee or the estate of the employee whose 
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through 
^ fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the condi-
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3Xc). 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which the governmental 
entity may be Uable, but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 1991 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obliga-
tions. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the 
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
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(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water 
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a 
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver the 
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural 
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the 
amount of available water. 1991 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity a s to act ions involving 
property. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for the 
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose 
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any adverse 
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mort-
gage or other hen said entity may have or claim on the 
property involved. 1965 
63-30-7. Repealed. 1991 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by de-
fective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
highways, bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 1991 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous 
or defective public building, structure, or 
other public improvement — Exception. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from 
a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 1991 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee — Ex-
ceptions* 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of employment 
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not 
the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of pro-
cess, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract 
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or 
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not 
it is negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or con-
trolled lands, any condition existing in connection with an 
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity 
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management 
or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located 
on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement; 
(18) the activities of; 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; o^ 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Copter 
5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition 
to all other immunities granted by law. 1996 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity" for taking' private, 
property without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Consti-
tution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities isj 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmen-. 
tal entity when the governmental entity has taken or dam* 
aged private property for public uses without just compensa-1 
tion. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according] 
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
199Ji 
tm 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is; 
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 
and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subset 
tion (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petitiojg 
for review under Section 63-2-404; and ^ 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to ig 
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brougnj 
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in » 
subsequent action. l99% 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents 
Service — Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations thai 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begin*| 
to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governs 
mental entity, or against an employee for an act or on^ s l0JI 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within'*Dfl 
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£pe of employment, or under color of authority shall file a 
litten notice df claim with the entity before maintaining an 
tion, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to 
wj claim is characterized as governmental. 
~[3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible gov-
ernmental entity according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the 
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an exten-
sion, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the gov-
ernmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
1991 
S3-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time 
for filing notice. 
kA claim against the state, or against its employee for an act 
or-omission occurring during the performance of'his duties, 
lyithin the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
find the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
irises, or before the expiration of any extension of time 
banted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not 
the < function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1987 
63-30-13. Claim against pol it ical subdivis ion or its em-
V* > . /ployee — Time for filing not ice . 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension 
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether , 
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1987 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by 
governmental ent i ty or insurance carrier 
within ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shalj. aj^ Jthereon and notify the* 
&umant in writing of its. approved or piniat"A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day 
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
foiled to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. Denia l of c laim for injury — Authority and 
t ime for filing act ion against governmental 
entity. ^ 
Tl) Tf the clainTy&denied, a claimant may institute an action 
|&*thfe "district court-against'the "governmental entity or an 
^aployee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial 
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — 
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
over any action brought under this chapter, and such actions 
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so 
far as they are consistent with this chapter. 1983 
63-30-17. Venue of act ions . 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in 
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against 
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a 
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including 
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the 
claim arose. 1983 
63-30-18. Compromise and se t t l ement o f act ions . 
(1) Apolitical subdivision, after conferring with its legal 
officer or o^her legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, 
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or 
other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative 
Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less 
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk 
^Management Fund mayJbe liable; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative and the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services, compromise and settle 
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the 
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and 
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising and 
settling any claim of $100,000 or more. ^ 1995 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff i n action. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an 
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less 
than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity 
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails 
to recover judgment. ' 1965 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmenta l enti ty bars 
action against employee . 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action 
brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any 
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, 
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim. 1965 
63-30-21. Repealed. 1978 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited 
— Governmental entity exempt from execu-
tion, attachment, or garnishment. 
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the govern-
mental entity for exemplary or punitive damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any 
judgment entered against a state employee in the employ-
ee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or 
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state 
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would be required to pay the judgment under Section 
63-30-36 or 63-30-37. 
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue 
against a governmental entity. 1991 
63-30-23. Payment of c la im or judgment against state 
— Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against the state 
shall be presented to the state risk manager, or to the office, 
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for pay-
ment, if payment by said instrumentahty is otherwise permit-
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said 
judgment or claim shall be presented to the board of examin-
ers and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63-6-10. 
1987 
63-&0-24. Payment of claim or judgment against politi-
cal subdivision — Procedure by governing 
T>ody. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final 
judgment obtained against a political subdivision "shall be 
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid forthwith! 
from the general funds of said political subdivision unless said 
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted'by law 
or contract for other purposes. 1966 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against politi-
cal subdivision— Installment payments. 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during 
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not 
more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal sizet>r in 
such otherrjnstallments as are agreeable to the claimant. 
1965 
63-30-26.. Reserve funds for payment of claims or pur-
chase of insurance created by political subdi-
visions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve 
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivi-
sions make contributions to a joint reserve fund,-for the 
purpose of making payment of claims against the co-operating 
subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to*this 
chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to 
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all risks 
created by this chapter. 1983 
«i 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for pay-
ment of claims, judgments, or insurance pre-
1
 miums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all 
political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax suffi-
cient to pay the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an 
elected official or employee of any political subdivision, 
including peace officers, based upon a claim for punitive 
damages but the authority of a political subdivision for 
the payment of any judgment for punitive damages is 
limited in any individual case to $10,000; 
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or 
judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve 
fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments 
as may be reasonably anticipated. 
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for 
punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such 
insurance as authorized is money spent for a public purpose 
within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec. 5, 
Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the 
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No 
levy under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable 
value of taxable property. The revenues derived from this levy 
may not be used for any other purpose than those stipulated in 
this section. 1988 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance 
or self-insurance by governmental entity au-
thorized — Establishment of trust accounts 
for self-insurance. 
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may purchase 
commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase 
excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits 
of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this 
chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its 
employee may be held liable. 
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of self-
insurance, a governmental entity may self-insure with 
respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a 
trust account under the management of ari independent 
private trustee having authority with respect to claims of 
that character to expend both principal and earnings of 
the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation, 
discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses in-
cluding attorneys' fees, and to pay all sums for which the 
governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which 
a compromise settlement may be agreed upon. 
" (b) The monies and interest earned on said trust fund 
shall be subject to investment pursuant to Titl^ 51, 
Chapter 7, State Money Management Act of 1974, and 
shall be* subject to audit by the state auditor. , r>Zl 
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust 
agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee 
may authorize the trustee to employ counsel) to defend actions 
against the entity and its employees and to protect and 
safeguard the assets of the trust, to provide for claims invest 
tigation and adjustment Services, to employ expert witnesses! 
andr consultants, and to provide such other services andl 
functions necessary and proper to carry out the^purposes of 
the trust. 199V 
63-30-29. Repealed. 1983 
63-30-29.5. Liability in surance—Government vehicles 
operated by employees outside scope of eni* 
ployment. l^ 
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven by employ^ 
ees of the governmental entity with the express or implied 
consent of the entity, but which, at the time liability is 
incurred as a result of an automobile accident, is not beingj 
driven and used within the course and scope of the driver'* 
employment is considered to provide the driver with the 
insurance coverage required by Title 41, Chapter 12a. How* 
ever, the liability coverages considered provided are the niini^ 
mum limits under Section 31A-22-304. 1985 
63-30-30. Repealed. lfrjs 
63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of policy 
not in compliance with act. 
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issuett 
and purchased to insure against any risk which may arise air 
a result of the application of this chapter, which contains any 
condition or provision not in compliance with the require; 
ments of the chapter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, 
but shall be construed and applied in accordance with such 
conditions and provisions as would have applied had sucjjl 
policy, rider or endorsement been in full compliance with thi# 
chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid. **$ 
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03-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase 
or renewal. 
No contract or policy of insurance may^be purchased or 
renewed under this chapter except upon public bid to be let to 
Ike lowest and best bidder; except that the purchase or 
renewal of insurance by the state shall be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-56-1 through 
53-56-73. 1983 
53-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for employ-
ees authorized — No right to indemnification 
or contribution from governmental agency. 
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all of its 
employees against liability, in whole or in part, for injury 
or damage resulting from an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of an employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority, 
regardless of whether or not that entity is immune from 
suit for that act or omission. 
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a public 
purpose. 
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance providing 
coverage on behalf of a governmental entity or employee 
for any liability defined by this section, regardless of the 
source of funding for the coverage, the insurer has no 
right to indemnification or contribution from the govern-
mental entity or its employee for any loss or liability 
covered by the contract or policy. 
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or its em-
ployee under any faithful performance surety bond has no 
right to indemnification or contribution from the governmen-
tal entity or i ts employee for any loss covered by tha t bond 
based on any act or omission for which the governmental 
entity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under the 
provisions of Section 63-30-36. 1991 
63-30-34. Limitat ion of judgments against governmen-
tal entity or employee — Insurance coverage 
exception. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment 
for damages for personal injury against a governmental 
entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a 
duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in any 
one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in 
any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment 
to that amount. 
(b) A court may not award judgment of more than 
$250,000 for injury or death to one person regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is 
characterized as governmental. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment 
for property damage against a governmental entity, or an 
employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to 
indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the 
court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regard-
less of whether or not the function giving rise to the 
damage is characterized as governmental. 
(2) The damage limits established in this section do not 
apply to damages awarded as compensation when a govern-
mental entity has taken or damaged private property for 
public use without jus t compensation. 1991 
63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general coun-
sel for state judiciary, and general counsel for 
the Legislature in representing the state, its 
branches, members, or employees. 
(1) (a) After consultation with appropriate state agencies, 
the state risk manager shall provide a comprehensive 
liability plan, with limits not lower than those set forth in 
Section 63-30-34, that will protect the state and its 
indemnified employees from claims and liability. 
(b) The risk manager shall establish deductibles and 
maximum limits of coverage in consultation with the 
executive director of the Department of Administrative 
Services. 
(2) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary 
responsibility to provide legal representation to the judi-
cial, executive, and legislative branches of state govern-
ment in cases where Risk Management Fund coverage 
applies. 
Ob) When the attorney general has primary responsi-
bility to provide legal representation to the judicial or 
legislative branches, the attorney general shall consult 
with the general counsel for the state judiciary and with 
the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their 
assistance in defending their respective branch, and in 
determining strategy and making decisions concerning 
the disposition of those claims. The decision for settle-
ment of monetary claims in those cases, however, lies with 
the attorney general and the state risk manager. 
(3) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the 
general counsel for the state judiciary, determines that 
the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately 
defend the state judiciary, its members, or employees 
because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers 
concerns, or other political or legal differences, the Judi-
cial Council may direct its general counsel to separately 
represent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary under-
takes independent legal representation of the state judi-
ciary, its members, or employees, the general counsel 
shall notify the state risk manager and the attorney 
general in writing before undertaking that representa-
tion. 
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its 
own counsel under this section, the decision for settle-
ment of claims against the state judiciary, its members, or 
employees, where Risk Management Fund coverage ap-
plies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary 
and the state risk manager. 
(4) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after 
consultation with general counsel for the Legislature, 
determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot 
adequately defend the legislative branch, its members, or 
employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of 
powers concerns, or other political or legal differences, the 
Legislative Management Committee may direct its gen-
eral counsel to separately represent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature under-
takes independent legal representation of the Legislature, 
its members, or employees, the general counsel shall 
notify the state risk manager and the attorney general in 
writing before undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by 
its own counsel under this section, the decision for settle-
ment of claims against the legislative branch, its mem-
bers, or employees, where Risk Management Fund cover-
age applies, hes with the general counsel for the 
Legislature and the state risk manager. 
(5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or 
any other provision of this code, the attorney general, the 
general counsel for the state judiciary, and the general 
counsel for the Legislature may bill the Department of 
Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees ex-
pended by their respective offices, including attorneys' 
and secretarial salaries, m representing the state or any 
indemnified employee against any claim for which the 
Risk Management Fund may be liable and in advising 
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state agencies and employees regarding any of those 
claims. 
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk 
Management Fund for this purpose. 1990 
§3-30-36. Defending government employee — Request 
— Cooperation — Payment of judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a govern-
mental entity shall defend any action brought against its 
Employee arising from an act or omission occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its em-
ployee against a claim, the employee shall make a written 
request to the governmental entity to defend him: 
(i) within ten days after service of process upon 
him; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice 
the governmental entity in maintaining a defense on 
his behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with 
notice requirements imposed on the entity in connec-
tion with insurance carried by the entity relating to 
the risk involved. 
(6/ If the employee fails to make a request, or foils to 
reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental 
entity need not defend or continue to defend the employee, 
nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement against 
the employee in respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or 
Subject to any court rule or order, decline to continue to 
defend, an action against an employee if it determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur: 
(i) during the performance of the employee's du-
ties; 
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or 
, (iii) under color of authority; 
(b), that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or 
malice of the employee; or 
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim was 
based resulted from: 
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or 
greater by weight than the established legal 
limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree that rendered the person inca-
pable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of al-
cohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the 
person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally im-
paired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his 
job function because of the use of alcohol, because of 
the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as 
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined 
influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled 
substance as defined by Section 58-37-4. 
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to 
defend an employee, the governmental entity shall inform 
the employee whether or not it shall provide a defense, 
and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis for its 
refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not 
admissible for any purpose in the action in which the 
employee is a defendant. 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental 
entity conducts the defense of an employee, the governmental 
entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim. 
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an 
employee under a reservation of rights under which the 
governmental entity reserves the right not to pay a judgment, 
i? the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are established. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 affects 
the obligation of a governmental entity to provide insur-
ance coverage according to the requirements of Subsec-
tion 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5. 
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or 
declines to continue to defend, an action against its 
employee under the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), 
it shall still provide coverage up to the amount specified in 
Sections 31A-22-304 and 63-30-29.5. 1991 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs 
by government employee. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judg-
ment entered against him, or any portion of it, which the 
governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30-
^6, the employee may recover from the governmental entity 
the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred 
i*i his defense. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of 
^n employee against a claim, or conducts the defense under an 
agreement as providecf in Su6sectibn 63-30-36(6), the em-
ployee may recover from the governmental entity under Sub-
section (1) if: 
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omission 
upon which the judgment is based occurred during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employ-
ment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted1 
the defense in good faith; and 
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that the! 
injury or damage resulted from: 
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee; 
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being1 in) 
actual physical control of a vehicle: ^ 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to 0? 
greater by weight than the established legal 
limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree that rendered the person inca-
pable of safely driving the vehicle; 
(C) while under the combined influence of al-
cohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the 
person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally 
impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his 
job function because of the use of alcohol, because of 
the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as 
defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined, 
use of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled sub-, 
stance as defined in Section 58-37-4. M** 
§3-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by 
employee not required. 
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based 
On or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the, 
governmental entity or an employee, the employee may not be 
required to indemnify the governmental entity for the pa$ 
%ent. *** 
CHAPTER 30a 
REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS TO] 
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Section 
*>3-30a-l. Definitions. 
*53-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or e ^ 
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(e) identify state or local government actions that have 
Potential takings implications and, if appropriate, advise 
those state or local government entities about those 
^plications; 
(f) provide information to private citizens, civic groups, 
government entities, and other interested jDarties about 
takings law and their rights and responsibilities under it; 
**id 
(g) if appropriate and requested to do so by one of the 
Parties, mediate disputes between private property own-
, , % s and government entities that involve takings issues. 
. ' The private property ombudsman may not represent 
P ^te property owners, state agencies, or local governments 
££. ^ r t or in adjudicative proceedings under Title 63, Chapter 
»Administrative Procedures Act. 1997 
CHAPTER 35a 
SOCIAL SERVICE LICENSURE 
(Repea led b y L a w s 1988, c h . 1, § 407.) 
e3
*b.J to 63-35a-16. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 36 
INDIAN AFFAIRS 
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 
§§ 342 to 367.) 
Secti( Qn 
,"- **14. Species Protection Account. 
..' As used in this section, "species protection" means an 
a c
 °** to protect any plant or animal species identified as 
by the state or as threatened or endangered under 
t n e
 Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S.C. 16 Sec. 1531 et 
seq. 
' There is created within the General Fund a restricted 
ac??**nt known as the Species Protection Account. 
' The account shall consist of: 
(a) revenue generated Toy the brine shrimp tax provided 
*br in Title 59, Chapter 23, Brine Shrimp Royalty Act; and 
(A (b) interest earned on monies in the account. 
. 7 Monies in the account may be appropriated by the 
^ l a t u r e for the following purposes: 
(a) to develop and implement species status assess-
ments and species protection measures; 
<&/ to adfam 6ib&gtcaf<<jgou<jas <rf{?£t?fki6ecf&pee?e& 
Protection measures; 
f (c) to conduct studies, investigations, and research into 
\ e effects of proposed species protection measures; 
* (d) to verify species protection proposals that are not 
^ased on valid biological data; 
(e) for Great Salt Lake wetlands mitigation projects in 
%nnection with the western transportation corridor; 
v (f) to pay for the state's voluntary contributions to the 
Vtah Reclamation Mitigation and Conservation Account 
vender the Central Utah Project Completion Act, Pub. L. 
V 102-575, titles II-VI, lO^stat. 4605-4655; and 
, (g) to pay for expenses of the State Tax Commission 
5|j1jkl to 63-36-8. Repealed. 
£Tq^9 to 63-36-21. Renumbered. 
W
~*M01 to 63-36-213. Renumbered. 
6 3
"
3
^ 1 to 63-36-8. Repealed. 1991 
™^9 to 63-86-21. Renumbered as §§ 63-36-201 to 63-
36-213. 1991 
^ " ^ I O I to 63-36-213. Renumbered as §§ 9^9-101 to 
9-9-213. 1992 
CHAPTER 36a 
TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 
(Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 218, § 1.) 
* * % - / to63-36a-4. Repealed mi 
CHAPTER 37* 
MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS, 
RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO 
STATE OR POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS 
Sectii 
63-3?, l*n 
finder Title 59, Chapter 23, Brine Shrimp Royalty Act. 6 3 ~ 3 ^2 . (5} (A\(A\ r^[ie Purposes specified'in Subsections (4)(a) through 
{ * may be accomplished by the'state or, in an appropriation 
r> ' xie Legislature may authorize the Department of Natural 
, Wees to award grants to political subdivisions of the state 
x^ompl i sh those purposes. 
, Monies in the account may not be used to develop or 
, ^ ^ment a habitat conservation plan required under federal 
, , .Unless the federal government pays for a t least Ys of the 
Wt conservation plan costs. 1997 
CHAPTER 34a 
(Te rmina t ed by L a w s 1977, ch . 234, § 10.) 
6 3
"
3 1 a - l t o 63-34a-9. T e r m i n a t e d . 
CHAPTER 35 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
(Repea led b y L a w s 1988, ch . 1, § 407.) 
63-3> 3. 
When postmark date deemed filing date -*- Vfhen 
mailing date deemed filing date. 
Registered or certified mail — Record as proof of 
delivery. 
Filing date Jailing on Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday. 
63-3£ 
-1 to 63-35-13. Repealed. 
M . When postmark date deemed filing-date '— 
* When mailing date deemed filing date. ' ' 
or an reP°rt» ^^m*tax return, statement or other document 
,, ^ V payment required or authorized to be filed or made to 
. .
e S
^ate of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which 
* (1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall 
**e deemed filed or made and received by the state or 
*\>titical subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office 
mediation mark stamped upon the envelope or other 
ppropriate wrapper containing it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political 
.,ibdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is 
legible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or 
lade and received on the date it was mailed if the sender 
'stablishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, 
ax return, statement or other document or payment was 
. eposited in the United States mail on or before the date 
>r filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any 
uch report, tax return, statement, or other document 
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required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state 
or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days 
after written notification is given to the sender by the 
state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such 
report, tax return, statement, or other document 1967 
63-37-2. Registered or certified mail — Record as proof 
of delivery. 
If any such report, claim, tax return, statement or other 
document or payment is sent by United States mail and either 
registered or certified, a record authenticated by the United 
States post office of such registration or certification shall be 
considered competent evidence that the report, claim, tax 
return, statement or other document or payment was deliv-
ered to the state officer or state agency or officer or agency of 
the political subdivision to which addressed, and the date of 
registration or certificatioa shall be deemed the postmarked 
date. 1967 
63-37-3. Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or 
legal holiday. 
' If the date for filing' any such report, claim, tax return, 
-statement or other document or making any such payment 
/alls upon a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, such acts shall 
be considered timely if performed on the next business day. 
1967 
CHAPTER 38 
fefifcUDGETARY PROCEDURES ACT 
Section 
,,63-38-1. Short title, 
63-38-1.1. State Budget Office — Creation — Duties and 
responsibilities,
 t 
63-38-1.2. State budget officer—Appointment—Respon-
n #ibilities-*-^ Compensation. 
63-38-1.3, S ta te budgejt* officer's -xluty^to provide staff 
support &nd, advise gpyerjaor with regard to 
work programs. . ? 
63-38-1.4. Governor's authority to combine functions of 
State Budget Office and Office of State Plan-
* ning Coordinator. 
63-38-2. Governor to submit budget to Legislature — 
Contents — Preparation — Appropriations 
based on'current tax laws and not to exceed 
estimated revenues. 
63-38-2.5. Establishing a Budget Reserve Account — Pro-
viding for deposits and expenditures from 
the account. 
63-38-2.8. Repealed. 
63-38-3. Appropriations governed by chapter — Restric-
tions on expenditures — Transfer of funds. 
63-38-3.2,, Fees -*- Adoption, procedure, and approval — 
Establishing and assessing fees without leg-
islative approval. 
63-38-3.5. ^Internal service funds — Governance and re-
view. 
63-38-4. Duplicate payment of claims prohibited. 
63-38-5. Appropriations from special funds or accounts 
— Transfer by proper official only. 
63-38-6. Warrants — Not to be drawn until claim pro-
cessed — Redemption. 
63-38-7. Cash funds — Petty cash, application for — 
Cash advances — Revolving fund estab-
lished by law excepted. 
63-38-8. End of fiscal year — Unexpended balances — 
Funds not to be closed out — Pending claims 
— Transfer of amounts from item of appro-
priation. 
Section 
63-38-8.1. 
63-38-9. 
63-38-9.5. 
63-38-10. 
63-38-11. 
63-38-12. 
63-38-13. 
63-38-14. 
63-38-15. 
63-38-16. 
63-38-17. 
Nonlapsing authority. 
Revenue types — Disposition of funds collected 
or credited by a state agency. 
Agencies exempt from act. 
Overexpenditure of budget by agency — Pro-
rating budget income shortfall. 
Director of finance to exercise accounting con-
trol — Work programs — Allotments and 
expenditures. 
Uniform School Fund — Appropriations. 
Conditions on appropriations binding. 
Request for in-depth budget review of agency 
or program — Form of budget submitted. 
Purpose of review — Information submitted. 
Selection of activities for review — Coordina-
' tion with audits. 
Repealed. 
63-38-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Budgetary 
Procedures Act." 1969 
63-38-1.1. State Budget Office — Creation — Duties 
and responsibilities. 
There is created an office to be known as the State Budget 
Office attached to the office of the governor. The State Budget 
Office shall assist the governor in the preparation of the state 
budget and perform such duties and responsibilities as may be 
assigned by the governor or as are contained withiti this act. 
1979 
63-38-1.2. State budget officer — Appointment — Re-
sponsibilities — Compensation. 
The state budget office shall be under the:; supervision, 
direction/ and control of an officer known as the state budget 
officer. The state budget officer shall be responsible for carry-
ing out the governor's directions with regard to the prepara-
tion of the state budget in conformance with the specifications 
of this chapter. The state budget officer shall be appointed by 
the governor and shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. 
The governor shall establish the state budget officer's salary 
within the salary range fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, 
Chapter 22, State Officer Compensation. 1991 
63-38-1.3. State budget officer's duty to provide staff 
support and advise governor with regard to 
work programs. j 
The state budget officer, under the direct supervision of the 
governor, shall provide appropriate staff support to assist in 
the preparation of the state budget specified in Section 63-
38-2. The state budget officer shall also advise the governor 
with regard to approval or revision of agency work programs 
as specified in Section 63-38-11. 1979. 
63-38-1.4. Governor's authori ty to combine functions 
of State Budget Office and Office of State 
P lanning Coordinator. 
The governor may combine the functions of the State 
Budget Office with the functions of the Office of the State 
Planning Coordinator, if in the governor's judgment,^such 
combination will provide improved staff support and policy 
advice on both budgetary and nonbudgetary matters . 1979 
63-38-2. Governor to submit budget to Legislature — 
Contents — Preparation — Appropriations 
based on current tax laws and not to exceed 
estimated revenues. 
(1) (a) The governor shall, within three days after the 
convening of the Legislature in the annual general ses-
sion, submit a budget for the ensuing fiscal year by 
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—Default judgment. 
Appeal. 
Cited. 
Filed depositions 
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court 
are presumptively public under the Utah Pub-
lic and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1 
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be 
kept secret only on a showing of good cause. 
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 
1095 (Utah 1990). 
Service upon attorney 
—Presumption of authorization 
Where defendant engaged attorney only to 
file motion but never so notified court or attor-
ney, appearance of attorney to file motion 
raised presumption that he represented defen-
dant in full action. Where defendant presented 
no clear and convincing evidence to refute pre-
sumption, notice given to attorney of date set 
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v. 
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 R2d 454 (1966). 
When service required 
—Default judgment 
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-
dants of default judgment entered against 
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985 
addition of reference to Rule 55). 
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the default 
judgment to defendants did not invalidate the 
default judgment when defendants received the 
notice of default in time to move to set aside the 
judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins Co. v. D.T. 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Appeal 
Under former Rule 73(h),^time for appeal 
from default judgment in city court runs from 
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather 
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. 
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,288 P.2d 
786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d). 
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4 
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury 
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7 
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 P2d 806 
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores, 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at place of abode," or similar terms referring to 
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to 
352. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15; 
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413. 
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual 
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes 
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
Service of process by mail in international 
civil action as permissible under Hague Con-
vention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241. 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the 
designated period of time begjns to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed, after including any additional time under subsection (e), 
is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall 
be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the 
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act 
or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it. 
(d) For motions —Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be 
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 
5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is 
fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the court. Such an order may 
for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported 
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at 
some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or 
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; April 1, 1999.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1999 
amendment to subdivision (a) conforms the 
state rule to the federal rule. The amendment 
also makes it clear that weekends and holidays 
will be included in the computation of time only 
if the relevant periods including the three-day 
mailing period under subsection (e), is 11 days 
or more. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment inserted "by CJA 4-50 V in the first sen-
tence of Subdivision (d). 
The 1999 amendment inserted "after includ-
ing any additional time under subsection (e)w 
and substituted "11 days" for "seven days" in 
the last sentence in Subdivision (a). 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a), (b), 
(d), and (e) of this rule are substantially similar 
to Rule 6, F.R.C.P. 
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision (b), 
was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Cross References. — Amendment to plead-
ings to conform to evidence, time of motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, time of service, 
U.R.C.P. 4(b). 
Corporation or association, mailing of process 
to, U.R.C.P. 4(e)(5). 
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu-
larities, U.R.C.P. 32(c). 
Discharge of attachment or release of prop-
erty, U.R.C.P. 64C(f). 
Documents for state or subdivision, filing 
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3. 
Election laws, weekends and holidays in-
cluded in computation of time, § 20A-1-401. 
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge, 
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21. 
Juvenile Court Act, time computed according 
to Rules of Civil Procedure, § 78-3a-27. 
Legal holidays enumerated, § 63-13-2. 
New trial, time of motion for, after judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, U.R.C.P. 5<XcX2). 
Order defined, U.R.C.P. 7(b)(2). 
Pleadings and other papers, service by mail, 
U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1). 
Probate Code, mailing of notice of hearing, 
§ 75-1-401. 
Reference to master, time of first meeting of 
parties after, U.R.C.R 53(d)(1). 
Relief from judgment or order, time for mo-
tion, U.R.C.P. 60. 
Rules by district courts, U.R.C.P. 83. 
Service by mail, U.R.C.P. 5(b)(1). 
Substitution of parties, time of motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 25. 
Summons mailed as alternative to personal 
service, U.R.C.P. 4(g*. 
Time, how computed, § 68-3-7. 
Tribunal, board or office exceeding jurisdic-
tion, notice, U.R.C.P. 65B(e). 
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely 
filing, U.R.C.P. 12(k). 
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional time after service by mail. 
—Administrative procedure. 
—Failure to add days. 
Waiver of objection. 
—Industrial Commission. 
Computation. 
—Months and years. 
—Sundays. 
Enlargement. 
—Motion for new trial. 
—Notice of appeal. 
Designation of record. 
—Redemption from execution sales. 
Motions and affidavits. 
—Applicability of rule. 
Court orders. 
New trial. 
—Compliance with rule. 
Actual notice. 
Ineffective notice. 
Time to prepare. 
—Continuance. 
Surprise. 
Cited. 
Additional time after service by mail 
—Administrative procedure 
Subdivision (e) does not apply to extend the 
